Water Law Review
Volume 3

Issue 2

Article 19

1-1-2000

Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army
Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert.
filed, Jan. 14, 2000
Lucinda K. Henriksen

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/wlr

Custom Citation
Lucinda K. Henriksen, Court Report, Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps of
Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 14, 2000, 3 U. Denv. Water L. Rev. 423
(2000).

This Court Report is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at
Digital Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Water Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital
Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

Issue 2

COURT REPORTS

necessity of a permit and suggested doing the work upland away from the
swale, to which Kelly replied, in effect, "Don't worry, be happy." The
Corps again visited the property and observed the work Prisk was doing.
After an administrative hearing, the EPA assessed administrative penalties
against Prisk and Kelly in the amount of $3,000 and $4,000, respectively.
The district court upheld the penalties. Both men appealed to this court,
which affirmed the district court's decision.
Kelly and Prisk argued on appeal that they did not violate the CWA
because they did not do so knowingly. The court disagreed for three
reasons. First, their brief never developed this argument, thus the court
deemed it waived. Second, the court held civil liability under the CWA,
unlike criminal liability under the CWA, was strict. Last, even if the
statute required knowledge, the incident in 1990 put Kelly and Prisk on
notice that filling a wetland violated the CWA.
Kelly and Prisk also suggested that their actions caused no
environmental harm, even though there was some contradictory evidence.
The court stated that the CWA did not forbid the filling of wetlands,
rather, it forbade the filling of wetlands without a permit. The court found
that had Kelly applied for a permit, he might have received one (less than
one percent of such applications were denied in 1994). Nevertheless, Kelly
did not do so.
Contrary to their arguments, the court found that Kelly and Prisk's
fines were not too high or retaliatory in proportion to the amount of
damage caused. The intent of civil penalties under the CWA were to
punish and deter. While the EPA could have sought civil penalties up to
$25,000 per day, it chose instead to assess administrative penalties with a
maximum of $10,000 each.
In response to Kelly and Prisk's final
argument that the $7,000 in total fines violated the "excessive fines" clause
of the Eighth Amendment, the court said that when Congress had
determined the appropriate punishment, a fine well within the statutory
limits could not be grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offense.
While Kelly and Prisk could have made other, more persuasive
arguments, the court said, theirs was essentially nothing more than a
diatribe against federal power under the CWA.
Adam B. Kehrli
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States Army Corps
of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), petition for cert. filed, Jan. 14,
2000 (holding that because certain intrastate waters provided habitat to
migratory birds, and the potential aggregate result of the destruction of this
habitat and subsequent decrease in population of migratory birds
substantially affected interstate commerce, the United States Army Corps
of Engineers justifiably exercised jurisdiction over the waters at issue based
on the migratory bird rule).
The Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County ("SWANCC"), a
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consortium of twenty-three municipalities formed for the purpose of
locating and developing a disposal site for nonhazardous waste, instituted
this action to challenge the United States Army Corps of Engineers'
("Corps") exercise of jurisdiction based on the migratory bird rule over its
proposed "balefill" site. SWANCC proposed to build a balefill (a landfill
where disposed waste is baled before it is dumped) on approximately 410
acres of land, over half of which consisted of an early successional stage
forest and more than 200 permanent and seasonal ponds. Upon the initial
finding by the Corps that the aquatic areas on the site could potentially
serve as habitat for migratory birds crossing state lines, the Corps
exercised its jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), and
ultimately found that the aquatic areas serve as habitat to several species of
migratory birds. Specifically, the proposed balefill required the filling of
almost eighteen acres of known migratory bird habitat, and, relying on the
migratory bird rule, the Corps denied SWANCC's section 404 permit
application.
The migratory bird rule resulted from the Corps' longstanding
interpretation of the phrase "waters of the United States" in the CWA's
implementing regulations. This interpretation included intrastate waters
which were, or could potentially be used as, habitat for species protected
by Migratory Bird Treaties or which were, or could potentially be, habitat
areas for unprotected species of migratory birds which cross state lines.
Although SWANCC did not challenge the Corps' finding of migratory bird
habitat on the proposed site, SWANCC challenged the migratory bird rule
as a basis for the Corps' exercise of jurisdiction. In particular, SWANCC
argued that: (1) Congress did not have the authority under the Commerce
Clause to grant the Corps jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate waters
merely because of the presence of migratory birds; (2) the Corps exceeded
its statutory authority in interpreting that the CWA conferred jurisdiction
based solely on the presence of migratory birds in intrastate water; and (3)
the Corps did not promulgate the migratory bird rule in accordance with
the procedural requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").
The court rejected each of these challenges and upheld the Corps' exercise
of jurisdiction over aquatic areas that were found to serve as habitat to
migratory bird species, but did not address whether the Corps could
properly exercise jurisdiction over areas that were only potential habitats.
The court dispelled the constitutional challenge to the migratory bird
rule by invoking the cumulative impact doctrine. Under the cumulative
impact doctrine, a single activity that by itself had no recognizable effect
on interstate commerce might still be regulated if the aggregate effect of all
similarly-typed activities had a substantial impact on interstate commerce.
Citing various statistics exemplifying the effect of the presence of
migratory birds on interstate commerce, the court found that the
destruction of this habitat and the accompanying decrease in population
substantially affected interstate commerce. This aggregate effect justified
regulation under the Commerce Clause.
With regard to SWANCC's challenge that the Corps exceeded its
statutory authority in interpreting the CWA to confer jurisdiction over
intrastate waters based on the presence of migratory birds alone, the court
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first noted that to assert jurisdiction under the rule, the Corps had to first
make a factual determination that a body of water provided a habitat for
migratory birds. That is, the Corps had to establish that the water was not
merely a place a bird might occupy momentarily, but rather that the water
was the place where the species naturally lived. Additionally, recognizing
the existence of several international treaties and conventions designed to
protect migratory birds, the court found that the constitution's Supremacy
Clause clearly gave precedence to federal law in the regulation of
migratory bird species. The court reasoned that because it was within
Congress's Commerce Clause power to permit regulation of waters based
on the presence of migratory birds, the Corps could reasonably do the
same.
Finally, by noting the distinction between the APA's procedural
provisions pertaining to interpretative rules and policies as opposed to the
notice and comment requirements applicable to legislative rules, the court
classified the migratory bird rule as an agency interpretation and not a
substantive rule. The notice and comment provisions of the APA were
therefore inapplicable.
Thus, the court concluded that the Corps
reasonably and justifiably exercised jurisdiction over the isolated intrastate
bodies of water based solely on the presence of migratory birds utilizing
the water as habitat.
Lucinda K. Henriksen
Wisconsin v. Federal Energy Regulatory Comm'n, 192 F.3d 642 (7th
Cir. 1999) (holding that Wisconsin did not have standing under the Federal
Power Act to challenge the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission's
granting of six licenses for hydroelectric power projects proposed on the
Flambeau River).
Section 4(e) of the Federal Power Act ("FPA") authorized the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission ("FERC") to license hydroelectric power
projects on waterways subject to federal Commerce Clause regulation. In
exercising this authority, the FPA required FERC to consider whether a
proposed project was in the public interest.
FERC must take into
consideration, among other factors, the adaptability of a project to a
comprehensive plan for the "improvement and utilization of water-power
development, for the adequate protection, mitigation, and enhancement of
fish and wildlife." This determination mandates FERC to give equal
consideration to the fish and wildlife protection and enhancement aspects of
a project as it does to a project's water-power development potential.
At issue in this case was FERC's 1998 issuance of licenses for six
hydropower projects on the Flambeau River, a tributary of the Chippewa
River, in Wisconsin. In accordance with applicable regulations, through
the course of the licensing process, the applicants for the proposed projects
consulted with the appropriate state regulatory agencies. Additionally, the
applicants conducted a year-long fish entrainment study in five of the six

